Introduction
The Community Remedy was introduced in England and Wales by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) as part of wholesale changes to anti-social behaviour (ASB) policy that sought to 'put victims first ' (Home Office, 2012a) . This new legislation marked a seminal moment in ASB policy because previous powers primarily focused on the activities of perpetrators. During the development of the new legislation, the Home Office (2012b) found that some police forces were using community resolutions and conditional cautions to address minor cases of ASB as an alternative to the formal criminal justice system, but they were not used consistently across forces. Thus, the Community Remedy was created to provide a transparent framework for both the public and victims to be involved in the justice process. The premise of the Community Remedy is that victims of crime and ASB are able to have a say in the punishment of their offender, by selecting a penalty from a predetermined 'document' of informal 'actions'. Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and their 3 associated police forces were given the responsibility to create a bespoke, locallyrelevant Community Remedy document 1 and enforce it within their area. The Remedy can be used when a community resolution 2 , conditional caution or youth conditional caution 3 has been selected as the chosen disposal, with police officers responsible for ensuring the chosen action is appropriate and proportionate to the offence. Both the victim and offender must agree to the Community Remedy as a course of action, with the offender having to admit their guilt for the offence (Home Office, 2014) .
Formulating the Community Remedy policy so it is delivered by the police alone marks a departure from the commitment to tackling ASB using a multi-agency approach (Cooper et al., 2009) . Creating a police-led power does not reflect the wide range of agencies who are involved in tackling ASB, which often includes the local authority, registered providers of social housing and youth offending teams.
1 'Menu' and 'sanctions' were the original terms used in the draft of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill (2012) and in the Home Office (2013) consultation report. However, these terms were replaced by 'document' and 'actions' in the Act itself (2014) . Some police forces still use the original terminology; however the most recent terms will be used in this article. 2 In England and Wales, a community resolution is a nationally recognised term that is used when an incident or crime is diverted outside of the formal criminal justice system. A community resolution can be used with both youth and adult offenders to administer a non-statutory, and often restorative, disposal. The views of victims are taken into account when reaching agreement about the disposal and offenders must take responsibility for commission of the act. 3 A conditional caution also diverts an incident or crime outside of the formal criminal justice system when an offender both admits to commission of the offence and accepts conditions imposed by a police officer. The conditional caution was initially introduced in the Criminal Justice Act (2003) and was updated in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (2012) which also established youth conditional cautions.
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The research outlined in this paper is the first to examine the operationalisation of the Community Remedy powers by PCCs and the police, and provides a significant initial insight into whether the Home Office's promise to 'put victims first' has been translated effectively into practice. This is important because figures from the Crime Survey for England and Wales show ASB to be a widespread problem, with 1.66 million incidents recorded by police in 2017-18 (Office for National Statistics, 2018a) . This is supported by data that highlights the proportion of people who perceive high levels of ASB in their area, which currently stands at 10% (Office for National Statistics, 2018b).
The implementation of the Community Remedy offers an opportunity for this paper to explore the extent to which PCC's are seizing the initiative (or not) in this area and to provide some preliminary analysis of local variations in policy implementation. The aim of the paper is to present the findings of a benchmarking exercise, which ascertains how the Community Remedy has been established and implemented by PCCs 4 and police forces at a local level. The research objectives were to: shed light on the scope and detail of the community consultations undertaken by PCCs, examine the availability and contents of the Community Remedy documents to the public, and assess police usage of the new power. The authors provide an analytical framework through which the implementation of victim-oriented strategies can be understood in local contexts. As a consequence of this, the paper informs debates about the realities of democratic localism when delivered through PCCs and provides some initial feedback on the utility of the Community Remedy as a victim-focused ASB policy.
ASB, Victims and Restorative Policing
The policy repositioning of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition and subsequent Conservative governments has raised ASB victims' expectations of achieving justice, particularly through the two core victim-focused powers, the Community Remedy and the Community Trigger 5 , which set out to improve victim satisfaction with the criminal justice process (Duggan and Heap, 2014) . The Home
Office conducted a consultation exercise in 2013 to seek views from both ASB-related organisations and the general public about their plans to implement the Community Remedy. In general, the public supported victims being involved in the punishment of their offenders (Home Office, 2013) . The Association of Chief Police Officers (now known as the National Police Chiefs Council) and police forces were in favour, but cautioned against increased bureaucracy and threats to police discretion. PCCs 5 The Community Trigger was also introduced by the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014). It forces the authorities to review their responses to complaints of ASB in circumstances where the victim feels no action has been taken, if a particular local reporting threshold has been met. See Heap (2016) for a critical discussion.
provided mixed responses, with the major concern being inconsistencies in practice.
The most critical response was from the Magistrates' Association who felt that responses to ASB should be dealt with by the courts because a lack of judicial oversight and the informality of out of court sanctions would lead to more offending (Home Office, 2013) . This viewpoint is challenged by a growing body of evidence which indicates that the use of informal community-based practices can lead to lower rates of re-offending, reduced costs and improved victim satisfaction (Bazemore, 2000; Shapland et al., 2008; Clamp and Paterson, 2016) . This latter perspective seems to have been supported by Home Office guidance which offered much flexibility for local implementers.
Home Office (2014 Office ( , 2017 We revisit this proposition throughout the paper by using the Community Remedy as a vehicle for assessing the role of PCCs as enablers of democratic localism.
The Community Remedy has the potential to meet victims' needs because it adds an element of restorative justice to the ASB agenda which had been largely missing from existing tools and powers. The contribution of restorative approaches to the justice process and, in particular, to reductions in reoffending has been increasingly recognised (Shapland et al., 2008; Sherman and Strang, 2012) yet questions remain about whether restorative principles will transfer effectively to ASB in a manner that empowers victims. Braithwaite (1989) explains how restorative justice should be understood as a holistic approach to individual and collective harms, yet the most widely used definition of restorative justice in the UK is Marshall's (1999:5) narrower description of 'a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future'. In practical terms, this latter definition seeks to capture activities which re-9 engage individuals and communities yet remain components of traditional justice processes.
Police use of restorative justice in England and Wales emerged during the late 1990s although this initial experimentation stagnated and many of the pilot programmes disappeared (Paterson and Clamp, 2012) . (Crawford and Clear, 2001) , it is also possible to view differences in practice as evidence of the strengthening of democratic localism.
The Community Remedy process seeks to mobilise the democratic potential of civic enterprises and 'informal modes of organising space, livelihood and citizenship' (Roy, 2010) . Using 'informality' as a response to urban problems has been most evident in the Global South where state services and resources are limited, although it is evident that similar shifts in governance can emerge in developed states experiencing neoliberal roll-back (Featherstone et al., 2012) . Citizen distrust in formal local and national administrations can be counteracted by bottom-up initiatives that operate in a democratic and inclusive manner that incorporates the concerns of the victimised and marginalised. Victim-oriented approaches challenge the offender-oriented assumptions and priorities of state officials and their tendency to focus upon victims' administrative needs to the detriment of mechanisms for building resilience and community capital (Walklate, 2011; Duggan and Heap, 2014) . Under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) individuals and organisations can make requests for data held by public authorities, including the police. FOIs should be made in writing and the authorities must respond within twenty working-days, with either the requested information in full or a refusal to provide the information based on twenty-three exemptions detailed in the Act (see Bows (2017) for further details).
Submitting FOI requests enabled us to access information from police forces that was not readily available in the public domain, which democratises the research process and allowed us to access a large amount of data within a small research project (Savage and Hyde, 2014) . The findings from each data collection component built up a useful picture of how PCCs and police forces have adopted these nationally prescribed powers at a local level. They also demonstrate how each local force is catering for the needs of ASB victims (or not).
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Findings
The findings from this study will be reported in three sections, namely: the public consultation, availability and contents of the Community Remedy documents, and usage.
Public Consultation
To determine the extent of the public consultations undertaken by PCCs, a search of their websites was conducted (see Table 1 updates to the available data during the review conducted in July 2017 but when this data was reviewed again in July 2018 10 of the 18 websites had been updated.
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It was clear, in many instances, that delays to publication had been influenced by other policy developments as the Community Remedy was integrated into wider reviews of ASB, restorative justice and the use of out-of-court disposals. Thus, there is evidence of divergence during the implementation process as regional policy entrepreneurs integrate the community remedy into ASB, restorative justice and other policy agendas. Table 1 provides an illustration of the data.
[INSERT Where details of a public consultation were provided, the preferred mode for collating responses was via a survey function on the PCC website, which was usually available for four weeks. Nevertheless, significant discrepancies were found between PCCs in relation to the numbers of responses obtained and the efforts put into generating public engagement. For example, one force obtained 3,500 responses (highest) compared to another that received only 100 (lowest). Some PCCs went to great lengths to generate a large sample size, such as emailing contacts (one PCC emailed 2400 agencies/groups on the PCC's mailing list) and others circulated press releases. Others fared poorly in comparison, with one website still containing a link to an out of date survey (by a number of months) and no further evidence of the outcome of the consultation. While some regions were late implementers of the Community Remedy, it was also clear in the final stages of the data collection that many PCCs had improved the transparency of their consultation processes via dedicated webpages. Despite this, the method of presenting consultation data and reports remained divergent across the 43 regions.
These findings recall the 'postcode lottery' critique of other locally governed community justice initiatives (Heap, 2016) . The data also demonstrates that on average, where sample sizes were reported, that consultations numbers were in the low hundreds. From a researcher's perspective this reflects poor external validity, even before the self-selecting nature of the participants is considered. Conducting a web survey also limits participation to those with internet access, and with the capacity to use/engage with this medium; who might not necessarily be the ones who are most at risk of suffering ASB victimisation.
Availability and Contents of the Community Remedy Documents
According to the Home Office guidance (2014: 11), 'the Community Remedy document must be published'. The guidance does not specify where it should be published, but
given the prominence of the internet as a means of communication (Office for National Statistics, 2017) and the fact that both PCCs and police forces all have websites (POLICE.UK, 2017), publishing the documents online would have the greatest utility.
The websites of all 43 PCCs were searched during autumn 2016 to locate the local Community Remedy document (see Table 1 ). At this point, the document was A content analysis of the 37 available Community Remedy documents was undertaken to provide an insight into the number and types of actions (reparative, punitive or rehabilitative) selected for inclusion (see Table 1 ) 7 . There was a large amount of variance between the contents of the local documents. For example, the number of actions they contained ranged between 3 and 13. This demonstrates that the amount of choice victims have is markedly different, depending on where they live. The underlying rationale for each of the actions contained in the document was also considered. Reparative actions were the most commonly listed, the mean average for each document was 4.1 (with a range of 1-7). Most of these actions were taken directly, or adapted, from Home Office guidance (2014) and were standardised across the sample. For example: paying for the costs of damage caused, mediation, and restorative justice activities. This aligns with the policy rhetoric and restorative policing theme. Punitive and rehabilitative actions were much less common, with mean averages of 1.2 and 1.1, and ranges of 0-3 and 0-4 actions respectively. options. Firstly, 6 forces included a 'bespoke' option that allows any action to be taken so long as it is agreed by both parties. Two of these forces stated that this must be agreed by the officer's line manager. Whilst adding flexibility to the process, this also opens the potential for discrimination based on the high level of individual discretion available. Finally, 2 forces included a 'word of warning from a police officer or PCSO' as an action.
We also examined how similar the published Community Remedy documents were to the Home Office guidance document, which contains a list of 7 example actions. We were interested to see how innovative PCCs had been in creating responsive actions to meet the needs and demands of their local communities, and how much the public's views had been taken into account (based on the consultation process). Many of the documents demonstrated responsiveness to local issues, for example, some documents included reference to specific crimes such as graffiti, or specific locallybased structured activities such as litter picking. However, 100% of the actions on 6 documents were taken directly from the Home Office guidance. In one of these force areas, the PCC had not demonstrated any evidence of undertaking a public consultation. Nevertheless, 5 of the documents were from PCCs that did not demonstrate engagement with the community, which provokes questions about the utility and value of the consultation process. adoption. We received responses from 31 forces, with the information refused on 9 occasions 9 (see Table 1 ). Where information was provided, the data we received was eclectic. Of the 22 forces that provided details, 2 stated that no information was held.
Usage
All police forces in England and
The remaining 20 forces provided an extremely diverse array of data, which did not necessarily answer the questions posed (despite the questions being phrased to request very specific information).
In terms of usage, the Community Remedy has been used by 13 forces, 4 did not give a specific answer (e.g. 'X police force has considered the use of the Community Remedy'), with the remaining 3 forces saying they had used it, but referring to 'community resolutions' instead. This is the umbrella term for out of court solutions Of the 12 forces that did not respond to the FOI request, two had also failed to publish a copy of the Community Remedy document on either theirs or the PCC's website.
Public authorities have a legal duty to respond to FOI requests within 20 working days.
When a response is not provided, researchers can lodge an appeal with the Information Commissioner to obtain the information. Based on the data already received, we decided not to pursue the non-responding forces through the Information Commissioner because we concluded that the quality of the data received from the other forces did not warrant the extra time and resources required to make the appeals (Savage and Hyde, 2014) .
Through the completed FOI requests, we found two force areas that did not publish their documents did confirm that they were using the Community Remedy, which Yorkshire, a third-sector stakeholder plays a key role in delivering restorative services, whilst in Essex an inter-agency structure underpins a range of restorative options.
These structures establish a clear restorative voice in the Community Remedy policy development, articulation and implementation process.
Examining Table 1 While the police act as gatekeepers to both the formal criminal justice system and the Community Remedy they are also increasingly involved in supporting diversion to other agencies as part of their demand reduction agenda and, in some regions, are proactively responsibilising other statutory and third sector agencies to take a more prominent role in victim-oriented community interventions (see, for example, Beacon, 2019 ). Yet, although the Community Remedy policy is victim-oriented in appearance it is ultimately system-oriented in delivery (Davies, 2007) and elsewhere in the data there is evidence of limited buy-in at the local level to a victim focus, public 28 consultation and the principles of democratic localism that local officials and institutions are supposed to exemplify.
The diversity of responses and unevenness in the implementation of the Community
Remedy policy was further illustrated by the range of 'community resolutions' that were referred to by ten forces. It was clear in these instances that the Community
Remedy had been subsumed into a range of options for community-based resolutions.
Similar confusion was found in Shapland et al.'s (2017) Remedy will soon be characterised as providing a postcode lottery, similar to the Community Trigger (Heap, 2016) .
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As well as the structural, developmental and implementation concerns highlighted here, further investigation is required to understand how ASB victims experience the Community Remedy. The way ASB manifests in communities may not necessarily be suitable to a restorative approach. ASB is often characterised by persistent nuisance behaviour, which can escalate in severity where victims and offenders reside in close proximity. The perpetrator may have been caught committing their first offence, but their individual ASB might be experienced by the victim as part of a campaign of targeted harassment. As such, it is questionable whether the Community Remedy is the best tool to i) initially stop the behaviour in question, and ii) prevent it from reoccurring in the long term. Victims must give their consent to use the Community Remedy; however they may feel that they have no option but to agree. Restorative approaches implicitly require some recognition of harm, and even remorse, yet neighbourhood disputes tend to be underpinned by more retributive feelings.
Consequently, the Community Remedy may be unsuitable due to the fear of reprisals.
Fear was found to be a major barrier to reporting ASB by Heap (2010) , with the prospect of the Community Remedy potentially fuelling additional under-reporting if a victim feels they may be putting themselves at further or increased risk of victimisation (which also affects victims' potential to access the Community Trigger). Reductively, 32 the policy rhetoric champions that 'what matters is that the punishment will be chosen by the victim' (May, 2012) yet this oversimplifies the proximity and reporting tensions associated with ASB.
Conclusion
It is certainly too early to make sense of the role of the Community Remedy within the ever-evolving complex of community and criminal justice interventions, but it is possible to offer some initial commentary on its first phase of usage. As expected, the The paper thus illustrates the growth in importance of processes of devolution that seek to both enhance democratic engagement at the local level and responsibilise a range of agencies in the policing of ASB and other forms of low level disorder. It is this potential to strengthen democratic localism and mobilise civic enterprises through a mixture of formal and informal modes of policing that will lead to the successful implementation and use of the Community Remedy.
